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166 EsTATE oF FERRALL [41 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22204. In B11nk. .June 30, 1953.J 
Estate of JOHN C. FERRALL, Deceased. ALEXANDER 
C. HAMILTON, as Executor, etc., Respondent, v. BANK 
OF AMERICA, as Ootrustee, etc., et al., Appellants. 
[1] Trusts- Control of Trust Property- Supervisory Power of 
Court.-Trustee's exercise of a sole or absolute discretion 
vested in him by trust instrument is subject to court review if 
trustee acts in bad faith or fraudulently. 
[2] !d.-Control of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Court. 
-Whether good faith has been exercised by trustee, or whether 
fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion has been committed, 
is subject to consideration by court on appropriate allegations 
and proof. 
[3] !d.-Control of Trust Property-Supervisory Power of Court. 
-It is against public policy to permit settlor of trust to relieve 
trustee of all accountability to the courts. 
[4] Id.-Construction.-A trust instrument which provides that no 
part of trust estate shall pass to beneficiary's husband, 
and which specifically provides that only contingencies on 
which beneficiary would be entitled to gift of entire corpus 
are those by which her marriage to him is terminated by his 
death or by his divorce from her, may not be construed as 
showing that settlor intended that during life of beneficiary 
and continuance of her marriage the husband should be re-
lieved of responsibility for maintenance of his wife, a re-
sponsibility provided for in Civ. Code, § 155. 
[5] Husband and Wife-Liability for Wife's Support.-Husband 
has duty to support wife even though she has an estate of her 
own. 
[6] !d.-Liability for Wife's Support.-Where affirmative relief is 
sought on ground that there has been a shift in primary 
obligation of husband to support wife, it is incumbent on the 
one seeking relief to plead and prove facts which would justify 
such a shift, as an element of his cause of action. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1981.) 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 182; Am.Jur., Trusts, §§ 279, 287. 
[5] Duty of husband to provide necessaries for wife as affected 
by her possession of independent means, note, 18 A.L.R. 1131. See, 
also, Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 13 et seq.; Am.Jur., Husband 
and Wife, § 339. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 12] Trusts,§ 211; [4] Trusts,§ 164; 
[5, 6] Husband and Wife, § 120; [7, 8, 14] Trusts, § 347; [9-11] 
Trusts, § 204; [13] Trusts, § 373. 
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[7] Trusts-Execution of Trust-Distribution of Property.-' Where 
intent of trust instrument is to preserve corpus of trust intact 
for distribution to remaindermen except in event the income 
is insufficient to meet needs of beneficiary, in construing this 
latter provision the settlor's intent to withhold benefit of cor-
pus from beneficiary's husband .must be taken into considera-
tion. 
[8] Id.- Execution of '!'rust- Distribution of Property.-Unless 
language of trust instrument affirmatively reveals an intention 
to make a gift of the stated benefaction regardless of bene-
ficiary's other means, the trustee should consider such other 
means in exercising his discretion to disburse the principal. 
[9] !d.-Control of Trust Prop~rty-Powers of Trustee.-.A trust 
must be. administered in accordance with intentions of settlor. 
[lO] Id..-Oontrol of Trust Property-Powers of. Trustee.,.-Extent 
of discretion conferred OJ;l tr1;1stees depends primarily on mani-
festation of intention of settlor. 
(11] !d.-Control of Trust Property-Powers of Trustee.-Mere 
fact that trustee is. given discretion does not authorize him to 
act beyond bounds of a reasonable .judgment. 
[12] Id.:_Cont:t'ol of '!'rust Property-Supervisory Power of Court. 
-Even though· it is provided that trustees shall have absolute 
or unlimited or uncontrolled discretion, the court may. inter~ 
pose if trustee does not act in a state of mind in which it wa11 
contemplated by settlor that he would act. 
[13] Id.-Aetions-Presumptions.-Trustees are entitled to pre~ 
sumption that they acted in good faith. 
(14] Id. __.Execution of '!'rust- Distribution of Property,- Al-
though trl1St instrument provides that trustees, in their sole 
discretion, may invade corpus of . trust estate to provide for 
the "care, needs and comforts" of beneftciary if income :from 
corpus is insuffieient for such purpose, refusal to invade corpus 
because beneficiary was not in actual need is not an ab'Q.se of 
(Jiseretion where trustee§, shortly after Hnotice and dem11,nd11 
that corpus of trust be invaded was s!lrved on them, requested 
information from beneficiary's husband to establish claim .1rJ.ade 
by him as guardia~ of beneficiary, who had beim dechtred in-
competent, but .no showing was made by him that any medical 
bills remained unpaid o:r that he would be unable to provide 
his wife with medical care and treatment in the fnture1 and 
where trustees concluded, as result of indepeiJdent investiga-
tion, that obliga;tions .of beneficiary were being met and .that 
she was receiving adequate medical care and treatment. 
[ 8] . Trust provi.sions for payment, in trustee's . discretion or for 
a designated purpose,of part or all of the principal to a beneficiary, 
note, 2 A.L.R.2d 13'83. See, also, CaJ.Jut., Trusts, § 169 et seq~; 
Am.Jur., Trusts, § 481 et seq. 
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APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County directing testamentary trustees to make pay-
ment to beneficiary. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed. 
Earle M. Daniels, Burdette J. Daniels, Hallam Mathews 
and Eugene M. Elson for Appellants. 
Potter, Potter & House and Bernard Potter, Jr., for Re-
spondent. 
SHENK, J.-Separate appeals have been taken by the 
trustees and the contingent remaindermen of a testamentary 
trust from an adverse decision in a proceeding brought by the 
guardian of the beneficiary, an incompetent person, under 
section 1120 of the Probate Code. The proceeding was brought 
to compel the trustees to exercise the discretion vested in 
them to invade the corpus of the trust estate to provide for 
the "care, needs and comforts" of the beneficiary. 
John C. Ferrall died testate on October 5, 1940. Surviving 
·were his son, George D. Ferrall, his daughter, Mrs. Faye F. 
Hamilton, the beneficiary of the trust here involved, and 
three grandsons, the children of George. The will was duly 
admitted to probate in Los Angeles County and a decree 
of distribution entered on February 5, 1943. The decree be-
came final. 
The will and the decree of distribution contained the fol-
lowing provisions : 
"(d) After payment of any expenses of management of the 
trust estate and administering this trust, including the com-
pensation for the services of the trustees, all income from the 
trust which is available for distribution shall be distributed 
monthly to and for the use and benefit of my daughter, Faye 
F. Hamilton, during her lifetime, or unless sooner terminated 
in accordance herewith. That if at any time the income 
from the corpus of the trust herein created is insufficient to 
meet the needs of my daughter, 1<-,aye F. Hamilton, then and 
in that event, in the sole discretion of the trustees herein, 
the trustees may pay to my said daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, 
such amounts from the principal or corpus of the trust 
sufficient to meet her nPeds, care and comforts. . . . 
"(f) Anything herein contained to the contrary notwith-
standing, this trm;t shall cease and terminate upon the fol-
lowing conditions: 
"(1-a) Provided my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, be liv-
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ing, this trust shall terminate upon the death of Alex C. 
Hamilton, or his divorce from my said daughter, Faye 1:<'. 
Hamilton, in which event all the property held by the trustees 
herein shall be distributed to my daughter, Faye F. Hamil-
ton, or 
"(1-b) Upon the death of my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, 
this trust shall cease and terminate and all the property held 
by the trustees under the terms hereof shall be distributed 
one-half to my son, George D. Ferrall, and one-half to my 
three grandchildren, George D. Ferrall, Jr., John Charters 
l1"errall and Frank M. Ferrall, share and share alike." 
At the time of the execution of the will and prior thereto 
Mrs. Hamilton was afflicted with an incurable disease known 
as multiple sclerosis. Her condition was known to the testator. 
After his death her condition became worse and in January, 
1942, she >vas placed in a sanitarium. Thereafter she was 
bedridden most of the time and required medical and nursing 
care. In 1948 she was declared to be an incompetent and her 
husband, Alex C. Hamilton, was appointed guardian of her 
person and estate. 
On two previous occasions the trust here involved has been 
before the courts. In the first action Mrs. Hamilton sought 
to have the trust declared invalid by reason of the inclusion 
therein of clause (1-a) above set forth on the ground that it 
was an invitation for divorce proceedings between herself 
and her husband, was against public policy and rendered 
the entire trust provisions of the will void. Her efforts in 
that proceeding, if successful, would have resulted in the 
distribution to her of one-half of the estate freed from the 
trust requirements. She was unsuccessful. (Hamilton v. 
Ferrall (June 8, 1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 277 [206 P.2d 663] .) 
In June, 1947, Mrs. Hamilton petitioned the court to direct 
the trustees to make payments to her of $450 per month from 
income and corpus for her "needs, care and comforts," and 
to reimburse her from that source for sums theretofore paid 
by her for that purpose from her personal funds. The trial 
court in that proceeding found that it was the intention of 
the trustor to provide for the maintenance of his daughter 
from corpus; that $400 per month was a reasonable sum to be 
paid for that purpose, and ordered the trustees to pay to her 
from that source that sum per month, commencing June 10, 
1947, and until further order of the court. 
On appeal that judgment was reversed on the ground that 
before the court could intervene to review and control the 
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action of the trustees in their administration of the trust 
there must be pleadings, proof and findings of fraud, bad 
faith or abuse of discretion on their part; and that no such 
pleading, proof or finding had been made. (Estate of Ferrall 
(July 1, 1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 712 [207 P.2d 1077].) 
While the appeal from the latter judgment was pending 
the guardian caused a demand to be served upon the trustees. 
The demand stated that the condition of the beneficiary had 
greatly deteriorated; that she required $475 per month for 
her care at the sanitarium; that prior to June, 194 7, she had 
disposed of most of her personal assets; that neither she 
nor her husband was in a position to defray the costs and 
expenses necessary to provide for her care, needs and comfort ; 
demanded that the trustees ''exercise'' their ''discretion'' as 
provided by the terms of the trust to invade the corpus for 
that purpose; and that to that end they enter upon an im-
mediate investigation of the facts and of the condition and re-
quirements of the beneficiary. 
This demand was served on the trustees on January 31, 
1949. On February 11, 1949, the trust officer in charge of 
the Ferrall trust at the Bank of America advised the guardian 
by letter that the trustees were not in a position to take any 
action on the demand until the questions involved on the 
appeal then pending were finally decided by a court of last 
resort. He requested that Mr. Hamilton furnish data as to 
the guardianship assets and disbursements from its inception, 
a statement as to his income, expense and financial status, and 
a financial statement of Hamilton's Men's Shop, Inc. The 
stock in that corporation was entirely owned by Mr. Hamilton 
and was apparently community property. About a year later 
Mr. Hamilton complied with this request. Thereafter the 
trustees determined that the beneficiary's expenses were being 
currently paid at the sanitarium; that she was not in need and 
there was no duty upon them to invade the corpus; that the 
primary obligation for her support and maintenance rested 
on her husband, and that he was paying her bills. 
In May, 1950, the trustees announced their refusal to 
comply with the demand. The present proceeding was then 
commenced in August, 1950, by the beneficiary, through her 
guardian, under section 1120 of the Probate Code by the filing 
of a supplemental petition to have it determined in accord-
ance with the terms of the demand: (1) that the necessary ex-
pense for the care of the beneficiary is and has been since 
January 31, 1949, the sum of $475 per month; (2) that the 
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beneficiary, prior to January 31, 1949, had expended and 
disposed of all of her personal assets, and that her only income 
from the trust estate is approximately $50 per month; (3) 
that by the terms of the will of the decedent the beneficiary 
is entitled to receive $475 per month from the trust estate 
and that resort to the corpus of the trust estate to that 
extent should be had, and ( 4) that the trustees did exercise 
their discretion and did refuse to invade the corpus for the 
beneficiary's needs, but that in so acting the trustees abused 
their discretion and acted in bad faith. 
It was also prayed that the court instruct and direct the 
trustees to pay to the guardian of the beneficiary the sum 
of $475 per month "and to resort to and invade the corpus 
of the trust to such extent as may be necessary or required 
from January 31, 1949, until further order of the court." 
The trustees filed a joint answer to the petition for instruc-
tions wherein they alleged among other things that, pursuant 
to the demand made upon them on behalf of the beneficiary, 
they had made a full and complete investigation of the 
matters and things set forth in the demand and that follow-
ing their investigation they did, on June 15, 1950, exercise 
their discretion and refused to invade the corpus of the trust 
estate, for the care and maintenance of the beneficiary. They 
alleged that in so doing they did not act in bad faith or abuse 
their discretion, and alleged that they acted in good faith 
and with reasonable and prudent judgment . 
.At the trial the following facts were stipulated to be true: 
that the testator knew that his daughter was afflicted with a 
progressive disease at the time he executed his will in 1938 and 
at the time he died in 1940; that in January, 1942, the condi-
tion of the beneficiary was such that she had to be placed 
in a sanitarium; that she had required medical and nursing 
care ever since; that during most of the period since 1942 she 
was completely incapable, physically and mentally, of handling 
her own affairs; that the average expense for her needs, in-
cluding sanitarium charges for room and board, nurses, medi-
cal care and supplies, for the period January 31, 1949, to May 
15, 1950, was and is $400 a month; that during that period 
Mrs. Hamilton had an income of $128.83 per month, including 
$82.50 from the trust estate, $38 from certain insurance, 
and $8.33 as dividends from certain stock, but that her 
available income averaged only $79.23 per month because of 
certain payments for attorneys' fees in connection with prior 
litigation ; that her sole remaining personal assets included 
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$70.70 in cash and 50 shares of Union Oil Company stock; 
and that the value of the corpus of the trust estate was 
$27,000. It was shown at the trial that this $27,000 consisted 
of negotiable and liquid assets. 
Because of the issue whether the trust instrument con-
templated that the beneficiary should be in actual need before 
the trustees were required to invade the corpus, evidence in 
the present proceeding vvas introducd as to possible community 
property earnings or community property interest of the 
beneficiary and her husband. The court did not make a finding 
that the husband had or had not ability to pay. It did find 
that during 1949 he had received $12,315.70 from Hamilton's 
Men's Shop, Inc., and that this sum had been returned as 
salary in the federal and state tax returns of Mr. and Mrs. 
Hamilton for that year. 
The court construed the language of the trust instrument 
to indicate the testator's intention that the only condition 
imposed by him on the invasion of the corpus of the trust 
was whether the income from the corpus was ''insufficient 
to meet the needs of my daughter.'' The court found that 
the trustees had decided that the income from the corpus 
was insufficient for those purposes. It also found that there 
was no express or implied requirement in the trust that the 
trustees consider either the individual income of the bene-
ficiary, her personal assets or her other resources in determin-
ing her needs; and that in refusing to invade the corpus for 
the purpose of paying any portion of the cost or expense 
of providing for the needs, care or comfort the trustees had 
abused their discretion; that they did not act in a state of 
mind in which it was contemplated they would act by the 
testator; and that they had acted beyond the bounds of a 
reasonable judgment. 
Judgment was entered ordering the trustees to determine, 
in the exercise of their discretion, the amounts necessary 
and sufficient, commencing Jan nary 31, 1949, which was the 
date of the demand, to meet, provide and pay for the necessary 
needs, care and comfort of the beneficiary; to determine the 
amount of net income distributed or distributable to her; and 
without regard to or consideration of her separate property 
or income or her interest in the community property or 
other sources of income, to invade the corpus and pay there-
from amounts representing the difference between the net 
income and the amounts they found necessary to provide for 
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her proper care, needs and comfort. The trustees and the 
remaindermen filed separate appeals. 
The contentions of the appellants are, first, that the de-
cision of the trial court is contrary to the law established in 
the prior litigation, and secondly, that the evidence is in-
sufficient to support the finding that the trustees were guilty 
of an abuse of discretion in refusing to invade the corpus 
as required by the demand served upon them. 
As to the first point the appellants rely especially on the 
language of the court in Estate of Ferrall, supra, 92 Cal.App. 
2d 712, where it is said at pages 715-716 : ''As above shown, 
the decree creating the trust provided that 'if at any time 
the income from the corpus ... is insufficient to meet the 
needs of my daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, then and in that 
event, in the sole discretion of the trustees herein, the trustees 
may pay to my said daughter, Faye F. Hamilton, such amounts 
from the principal or corpus of the trust sufficient to meet 
her needs, care and comforts.' Under that provision a court 
is not deprived of power to determine the fact as to whether 
the income from the corpus is insufficient to meet the needs 
of Mrs. Hamilton. By that provision, however, the matter 
of determining the amounts to be paid from the corpus, in 
the event that the income is insufficient to meet her needs, 
is left to the sole discretion of the trustees. Section 2269 of 
the Civil Code provides: 'A discretionary power conferred 
upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary 
discretion, but may be controlled by the proper court if not 
reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly 
conferred by the declaration of trust.' An absolute discretion, 
as to the amounts to be paid from the corpus, was conferred 
by the trust provisions herein. An absolute discretion, ex-
ercised in good faith by a trustee, cannot be controlled by 
a court on considerations going to the soundness of the 
discretion so exercised.'' 
It is therefore contended that it has been decided that 
it is within the "sole discretion of the trustees" to determine 
the amounts to be paid from corpus and that the determina-
tion of the trustees is binding on this appeal. 
There is nothing in the former decision which would imply 
that the ''sole discretion'' vested in and exercised by the 
trustees in this case is beyond court review. [1] If it were 
exercised fraudulently, in bad faith or in an abuse of dis-
cretion, it is subject to such review. [2] Whether good 
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faith has been exercised, or whether fraud, bad faith or an 
abuse of discretion has been committed is always subject 
to consideration by the court upon appropriate allegations 
and proof. (Estate of Marre, 18 Cal.2d 184 [114 P.2d 586]; 
Estate of Heard, 107 Cal.App.2d 225 [236 P.2d 810, 27 A.L.R. 
2d 133]; Estate of Smith, 23 Cal.App.2d 383 [73 P.2d 239] .) 
[3] The Restatement of Trusts states the general rule that 
''It is against public policy to permit the settlor to relieve 
the trustee of all accountability to the courts." ( § 187, com-
ment k.) The appellants contend, however, that in the present 
case the evidence establishes that as a matter of law the 
trustees exercised their discretion in good faith and that 
they are not otherwise accountable for their actions. 
The determination whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the finding of the trial court that the trustees have 
been guilty of an abuse of discretion requires an inquiry into 
the intentions of the settlor in providing for his daughter 
as he did, and an examination of the conduct of the trustees 
in the administration of the trust. 
It was unquestionably the intention of the settlor that 
one-half of his estate be set aside in trust for the benefit 
of his daughter during her lifetime. He made an outright 
gift to her of the income from the trust but the gift to her 
of the corpus was conditional. Had he intended a gift of 
corpus as well as income he could have done as he did with 
reference to his son and grandchildren to whom bequests 
were made without the imposition of a trust. It is beyond 
question that the settlor intended to provide, and did provide, 
that no portion of the trust estate should pass to the hands 
of Alex C. Hamilton, the beneficiary's husband. This is 
readily apparent from the terms of clause (1-a) of section II 
of the will wherein the settlor provided that if his daughter 
be living the trust should terminate upon the death of her 
husband or his divorce from her, in either of which events 
''all the property held by the trustees herein shall be dis-
tributed to my daughter." To make certain that Mr. Hamil-
ton should share no interest in the trust estate, clause ( 1-b) 
followed providing that "Upon the death of my daughter, 
Faye F. Hamilton, this trust shall cease and terminate and 
the property held by the trustees under the terms hereof 
shall be distributed one-half to my son George D. Ferrall, 
and one-half to my three grandchildren,'' sons of George, 
share and share alike. [ 4] Under the terms of the trust 
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it was clearly intended that Alex C. Hamilton should not 
obtain an interest in the corpus and also that the only con-
tingencies upon which Faye Hamilton would be entitled to a 
gift of the entire corpus were those by which her marriage 
to Alex C. Hamilton was terminated. By no process of 
reasoning or construction of the trust instrument could it 
properly be concluded that the settlor intended that during the 
life of his daughter and the continuance of her marriage 
Mr. Hamilton should be relieved of the responsibility for the 
maintenance of his wife. This primary responsibility is pro-
vided for in section 155 of the Civil Code as follows: "Hus-
band and wife contract towards each other obligations of 
mutual respect, fidelity, and support." [5] It is the duty 
of the husband to support his wife even though she has an 
estate of her own. (Guardianship of Thrasher, 105 Cal.App. 
2d 768, 776 (234 P.2d 230]; Davis v. Davis, 65 Cal.App. 499, 
501 [224 P. 478]; Shebley v. Peters, 53 Cal.App. 288 [200 P. 
364]; 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 15, p. 404.) 
The respondent does not question the authorities to the 
effect that it is the duty of the husband to provide support 
for his wife even though she may have an estate of her own, 
or that the court in guardianship matters may refuse to allow 
payment for the care of an incompetent wife from guardian-
ship funds. But he takes the position that ability to pay 
on the part of the husband must be shown and, apparently, 
that the showing of ability to pay devolves upon the party 
who insists upon the discharge of the husband's legal obliga-
tion. [6] But where, as here, affirmative relief is sought on 
the ground that there has been a shift in the primary obliga-
tion of support, it is incumbent upon the one seeking relief to 
plead and prove facts which would justify such a shift, as an 
element of his cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §1981; see, 
also, Guardianship of Thrasher, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 768.) 
[7] The obvious intent of clauses (1-a) and (1-b) was to 
preserve the corpus of the trust intact for distribution to 
the remaindermen, all lineal descendants of the settlor, except 
in the event that the income was insufficient to meet the 
needs of Faye Hamilton. In construing this latter provision 
the clear and steadfast intent to withhold benefit of the corpus 
from Mr. Hamilton must be taken into consideration. Had 
the settlor intended "needs" to be the total amount re-
quired to maintain and support his daughter, Mr. Hamilton 
would have benefited to the extent of his relief from his 
176 EsTATE OF FERRALL [41 C.2d 
primary, legal obligation to support her to the extent of his 
ability, and there is no showing or finding that he was not 
able to do so. Obviously, money for actual needs was intended 
to be taken from the corpus. Since all requirements had been 
and were being supplied from other sources, namely, by or 
through lVIr. Hamilton, an invasion of corpus for reimburse-
ment to him or the guardianship estate would be directly con-
trary to the intentions of the settlor and greatly to the prej-
udice of the remaindermen whose interests the trustees were 
also bound to safeguard. 
Courts in other states have construed provisions similar 
to those in the present case. In ""tlatter of Mar-tin, 269 N.Y. 
305 [199 N.E. 491], a will provided for the outright gift of 
the income of a testamentary trust with a conditional gift of 
the principal to the beneficiary ''as she may require for her 
care, support and comfort, during her natural life.'' The 
court concluded that the corpus could be invaded ''only in 
the event that the income from the trust fund supplemented 
by her independent income shall be insufficient to provide for 
her proper care, support and comfort.'' In a similar factual 
situation the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the 
testator did not intend that the trustees should invade the 
principal so long as the income and the available resources 
of the life tenants were sufficient for their comfortable sup-
port. (Peckha.m v. Newton, 15 R.I. 321 [4 A. 758) .) [8] In 
summarizing these and the holdings in other cases it was 
stated in 2 American Law Reports, Second Series, 1432: "By 
the weight of authority, unless the language of the trust in-
strument affirmatively reveals an intention to make a gift of 
the stated benefaction regardless of the beneficiary's other 
means, the trustee should consider such other means in exer-
cising his discretion to disburse the principal. ... '' 
[9] \Vhen we pass to the consideration of the duty of the 
trustees in the administration of the trust and their conduct 
in compliance therewith, there is no divergence of authority 
to the effect that the trust must be administered in accord-
ance with the intentions of the settlor. [10] The rule is 
well stated in section 187, comment j, Restatement of Trusts, 
page 488, as follows: ''The extent of the discretion conferred 
upon the trustees depends primarily upon the manifestation 
of intention of the settlor. . . . [11] The mere fact that the 
trustee is given discretion does not authorize him to act be-
yond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.'' [12] Even 
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though it is provided that the trustees shall have absolute 
or unlimited or uncontrolled discretion, the court may inter-
pose if the trustee does not act ''in a state of mind in which 
it was contemplated by the settlor that he would act.'' (Com-
ment j, p. 489.) 
As to the question whether the trustees here involved 
acted ''in a state of mind in which it was contemplated by 
the settlor" the evidence shows that the trustees concluded 
that the settlor intended that the beneficiary's needs be her 
actual needs and that they took into consideration Mr. Hamil-
ton's primary obligation and ability to provide for them. 
[13] The trustees are entitled to the presumption that they 
acted in good faith. (Estate of Canfield, 80 Oal.App.2d 443, 
451 [181 P.2d 732] .) [14] They contend that there is no 
evidence to the contrary and that the record affirmatively 
shows as a matter of law that their conduct was proper. 
This conclusion must be sustained. On February 11, 1949, 
11 days after the ''notice and demand'' that the corpus of 
the trust be invaded was served upon them, they requested 
information from Mr. Hamilton to establish the claim made by 
him as guardian. While awaiting this information they made 
an independent investigation and concluded that the obliga-
tions of the beneficiary were being met and that she was 
receiving adequate medical care and treatment. It was 
more than a year after their request for information that 
Mr. Hamilton supplied financial data. There was no show-
ing by him that any medical bills remained unpaid or that he 
would be unable to provide his wife with medical care and 
treatment in the future. For aught that appears in the 
record Mr. Hamilton provided for his wife's maintenance 
from the time of their marriage until she became ill. And 
there is positive and undisputed proof that the costs and 
expenses of his wife's care and maintenance after she be-
came ill were paid. Despite the request of the trustees, Mr. 
Hamilton failed to substantiate the allegations of the "notice 
and demand.'' The trustees were justified in concluding that 
the daughter was not in actual need and that the corpus of 
the trust should not be disbursed in payment of her expenses. 
Under these circumstances the conclusion is inescapable that 
on the facts furnished to them or within their knowledge 
from their own investigation the trustees were not guilty of 
an abuse of discretion in their refusal to invade the corpus 
for the purpose demanded. They made a reasonable investi-
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gation and did all that was required of them as fiduciaries to 
carry out the terms of the trust. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The more persuasive authority holds that where words 
such as those here used are involved, the amount required 
to be paid to the beneficiary of the trust is computed without 
consideration of his other sources of income and certainly 
not the resources of the husband of the beneficiary here. 
It is said: "It is a question of interpretation whether the 
beneficiary is entitled to support out of the trust fund even 
though he· has other resources. ·where the trustee is directed 
to pay to the beneficiary or to apply for him so much as is 
necessary for his maintenance or support, the inference is that 
the settlor intended that he should receive his support from 
the trust estate, even though he might have other resources." 
(Scott on Trusts,§ 128.4; emphasis added.) There being such 
an inference, the probate court could and did draw it and 
hence there is sufficient evidence to support its order. 
It is not to be supposed that a testator would intend that 
a beneficiary generally, or intended here that her husband 
should lead a useless, idle life thus producing no independent 
income. That, however, is precisely the result if considera-
tion must be given to independent resources. The natural 
tendency will be for the beneficiary or her husband, to eschew 
lucrative endeavor because every penny earned will be a 
penny lost as beneficiary of the trust. At least it is a reason-
able inference that the testator did not have such an inten-
tion. As the court said in the leading case of Holden v. 
Strong, 116 N.Y. 471 [22 N.E. 960, 961] : "We do not under-
stand that, in order to receive the benefit of the provisions 
of the will, it is necessary for him [beneficiary] to remain idle, 
and refrain from all personal exertion; neither does the fact 
that he is frugal and saving, and has accumulated a fund 
which he has deposited in the bank, deprive him of the right 
to the support provided for him. The trial court properly 
held that the trustee was to exercise a sound judgment and 
discretion as to whether the money necessary for the support 
and maintenance of the plaintiff should be delivered to him, 
and he allowed to procure it, or whether the board, clothing, 
etc., should be purchased and provided for him by the trustee.'' 
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That case was cited with approval and followed in In re 
Clark's Will, 280 N.Y. 155 [19 N.E.2d 1001], where it was 
said (p. 1003) : "The will clearly provides for payment by 
the trustee . . . of the entire income from the trust and of 
so much of the principal in addition thereto as, in the sole 
judgment of the trustee, shall by it be deemed necessary for 
every comfort and support of the widow. . . . In conformity 
to that purpose and intent, the trustee is required to furnish 
every comfort and support for the widow which it may deem 
in a sound discretion necessary out of income and, if required, 
out of the corpus, even to the extent of exhausting the entire 
corpus of the trust, without taking into consideration or ac-
count the personal income of the beneficiary from any other 
sottrce. Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471 [22 N.E. 960] ; Rezze-
mini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184 [140 N.E. 237]." (Emphasis 
added.) The Clark case was decided ( 1939) six years after 
In re Martin's Will (1933), 269 N.Y. 305 [199 N.E. 491], 
relied upon by the majority, and the Clark case does not even 
mention the Martin case. 
To the same effect as the Clark case and the quotation from 
Scott on Trusts, see Cross v. Pharr, 215 Ark. 463 [221 S.W.2d 
24] ; Hoops v. Stephan, 131 Conn. 138 [38 A.2d 588] ; In re 
Worman's Estate, 231 Iowa 1351 [4 N.W.2d 373]; Pearce v. 
Marcelltts, 137 N.J.Eq. 599 [45 A.2d 889]; In re Leonard's 
Estate, 115 Vt. 440 [63 A.2d 179]; and cases collected, Scott 
on Trusts, § 128.4; 2 A.L.R.2d 1383, 1431. 
Finally, the same rule is stated: "It is a question of inter-
pretation whether the beneficiary is entitled to support out of 
the trust fund even though he has other resources. The infer-
ence is that he is so entitled." (Rest. Trusts, § 128e; emphasis 
added.) 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the views expressed by Justice 
Carter. It further appears to me that the death of the bene-
ficiary, Mrs. Hamilton, provides no ground for avoidance of 
payment to her estate of the sums which she was entitled to 
receive while she was living. (See Board of Soc. Welfare v. 
County of Los Angeles (1945), 27 Cal.2d 81, 86, 88-89 [162 
P.2d 630] .) I, too, would affirm the judgment. 
